Supplemental Needs Trusts: The Movement Towards Reformation by Matthew M. Shatzkes
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 25 
Issue 4 Volume 25, Summer 2011, Issue 4 Article 6 
June 2011 
Supplemental Needs Trusts: The Movement Towards Reformation 
Matthew M. Shatzkes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew M. Shatzkes (2011) "Supplemental Needs Trusts: The Movement Towards Reformation," Journal 
of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 25 : Iss. 4 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol25/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS: THE
MOVEMENT TOWARDS REFORMATION
MATTHEW M. SHATZKES
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario:
The year is 1990 and you are an eighty-year-old grandparent with a
significant amount of wealth. In apprehension of your declining health,
you decide to set up trusts for your children and grandchildren.
Unfortunately, one of your grandsons is disabled, and wanting to ensure
that the grandson is cared for, you set up a trust solely for him. The trust
instructs the trustee to pay out the net income of the trust for the disabled
grandson's benefit during his lifetime. You pass away a year later and the
trusts take effect. Before your death, the grandson was receiving
government aid through Medicaid. Medicaid eligibility is based on a
person's income and ability to pay for medical care.' Now, however, the
proceeds of the trust are being counted as income for the grandson, thus
making him ineligible for Medicaid. As a result, the burden of caring for
this disabled grandson falls solely on the shoulders of the grandson's
parents, your son and daughter-in-law. Following your death, the
Legislature in 1993 adopts a new type of trust called a supplemental needs
trust. The supplemental needs trust allows a person to care for a disabled
person by giving them income, but instead of supplanting governmental
benefits, as a traditional trust would, the supplemental needs trust would
supplement them. As a result, the proceeds of the trust would not count as
the income of the disabled, allowing the disabled person to continue to be
eligible for government funded programs. In this case, it would allow the
grandson to continue to receive the income from the trust by supplementing
I U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (Jan. 5,
2010) available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaideligility ("Medicaid is available only to people
with limited income."); See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(h)(1) (2010) ("The term "assets", with respect to an
individual, includes all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not
receive. . . .").
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the aid he was receiving from Medicaid. Would you, as the grandparent,
want the trust to be modified by the courts to a supplemental needs trust?2
The hypothetical above illustrates an issue the Surrogate Courts in New
York have struggled with. The scenario illustrates a situation where a
decedent has already executed a trust before the legislature enacted Estate
Powers &Trusts Law (EPTL) §7-1.12,3 which authorized supplemental
needs trusts. Here the trustee would like the trusts to be modified into a
supplemental needs trust. A similar situation exists where the decedent
creates a trust after the enactment of EPTL §7-1.12, but due to error, a
regular trust is created and not a supplemental needs trust.4 Here the trustee
would like the error to be reformed by converting the trust into a
supplemental needs trust. Though the remedies sought are labeled
differently, the New York courts have treated these situations the same, 5
and in both scenarios the underlying issue is whether the courts are allowed
to change these trusts into supplemental needs trusts.
Historically, New York courts have held that the general rule is that there
is no reformation of testamentary instruments.6 The underlying policies
2 In re Will of Kamp, 790 N.Y.S.2d 852, 855-56 (2005) (arguing that government assistance
supplemented by trust income is in the best interest of wards); Estate of Rose Ciraolo, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 2,
2001, at 31 col. 4 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 2, 2001) (granting reformation of a will to obtain a supplemental
needs will where the decedent knew that the permanently disabled recipient relied on government
benefits and would not have wanted to disturb those benefits); See In re Estate of Newman, 856
N.Y.S.2d 500, 500 (2008) (noting the importance of the testator's intent to supplement, rather than
supplant, government benefits when creating a supplemental needs will); See also In re Estate of
Hyman, 836 N.Y.S.2d 493, 493 (2007) (interpreting E.P.T. L. § 7-1.12 as authorizing the creation of
non-self-settled supplemental needs trusts when (a) the person for whose benefit the trust is established
suffers from a disability and (b) the trust evinces the intent that the assets be used to supplement, not
supplant, government benefits).
3 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.12(b)(1) (2010) (providing that when a trust is
established for a disabled person, it shall be presumed that the creator of the trust intended that that
neither the principal nor income be used to pay for any expense which would otherwise be covered by
government benefits).
4 In re Rappaport, 866 N.Y.S.2d 483,485, 488 (2008) (allowing for the reformation of a will that
post dates the enactment of EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.2); See In re Estate of Longhine, 836
N.Y.S.2d 500, 500 (2007) (holding that even a will that clearly and unambiguously establishes a non-
supplemental needs trust may be reformed to create a supplemental needs will); See also In re Estate of
Hulett, No. 28,611, at 325 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 18, 1999) (finding that the decedent clearly intended that
the trust supplement government benefits based on language in the will instructing the trustee to take
into consideration other resources).
5 As the courts do not distinguish between these two scenarios, for the purposes of this article the
terms modification and reformation shall be treated the same. In fact, in deciding whether to reform a
testamentary trust to create a supplemental needs trust, "[C]ourts have not focused upon whether the
decedent's will was executed before or after ... the enactment of EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-
1.12.". Rappaport, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 487. Additionally, in making the decision to reform a will, courts
will look to case law involving wills executed both before and after the enactment of EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.12. Longhine, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
6 Rappaport, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 486. "Courts are generally loathe to reform testamentary instruments
and, as a rule, will not, unless reformation effectuates the testator's intent."; See In re Snide, 52 N.Y.2d
193, 197 (1981) (rejecting the traditional unwillingness to reform wills and stating, "Nor can we share
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behind the no- reformation rule stem from the fear that reformation of
testamentary instruments would frustrate the intent of the testator's
testamentary plan and lead to excessive litigation.7 Yet some New York
courts have reformed trusts into supplemental needs trusts when the
testator's intent is not frustrated, and the requirements of EPTL §7-1.12 for
a valid supplemental needs trust are satisfied.8 The supplemental needs
trust exception to the no reformation rule has been met with debate because
some courts have refused to recognize it and have instead applied the
traditional no-reformation rule. 9
This article will argue that although the New York courts should
continue to enforce the traditional no-reformation of testamentary
instruments rule, they should also recognize the supplemental needs trust
exception. The New York courts should recognize this exception for three
reasons. First, reformation should be permitted because caring for the
disabled is an important public policy.10 Government assistance has
changed in three important respects over the years. It has evolved from a
gift into a right, it is no longer associated with a stigma, and it is viewed as
an insurance benefit rather than a charity.I1  These changes encourage
the fears ... that our holding will be the first step in the exercise of judicial imagination relating to the
reformation of wills.").
7 Snide, 52 N.Y.2d at 196 (refuting the view that testator intent attaches irrevocably to the
document prepared and instead focusing on the testamentary scheme reflected); See Rappaport, 866
N.Y.S2d at 923. "It is of paramount importance that the testator's actual purpose be determined and
effectuated to the extent it comports with the law and public policy."
8 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hyman, 836 N.Y.S.2d 493, 493 (2007) (finding that courts have shown a
willingness to reform wills to obtain a supplementary needs trust where the testator's intent to
supplement government benefits is evident from the testamentary instrument); In re Will of Kamp, 790
N.Y.S.2d at 857-58 (2005) (noting that state public policy authorizes and encourages the use of
supplementary needs trusts).
9 In re Accounting of Tamargo 115 N.E. 462, 463 (1917) (commenting on the traditional
reluctance to reform trusts and stating, "When the purpose of a testator is reasonably clear by reading
his words in their natural and common sense, the courts have not the right to annul or pervert that
purpose upon the ground that a consequence of it might not have been thought of or intended by him.");
In re Rubin, 781 N.Y.S.2d 421, 426 (2004) (denying reformation of a testamentary trust into a
supplemental needs trust).
10 See In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc.2d 952, 959 (1978). "Charity bestowed by the State or any
local political subdivision thereof to alleviate the suffering of the destitute is a grant or gift by an
enlightened government that seeks to keep its less fortunate citizens from deprivation and want. It is in
fact a gift by all the other citizens of the State and community who work, earn and pay taxes to the less
fortunate who are unable to work and support themselves." (quoting In re Van Gaalen's Estate, 38
Misc.2d 853, 855 (1963)); See generally In re Roger A. Wick v. Gozigian, 85 A.D.2d 805 (holding that
when is trustee is authorized only in the event of an emergency to invade the trust corpus for the benefit
of the son, who was institutionalized at the time the will in question was executed, the trustee lacked the
authority to invade the corpus to pay for the beneficiary's institutionalization).
11 Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 959-60 (explaining the emergence of the modern welfare state and the
corresponding development of constitutional due process rights to safeguard these benefits). See
generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (determining that failure to provide a fair heading
prior to the termination of welfare benefits violated the due process clause).
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reformation, which give the court the ability to reform a trust to allow a
disabled beneficiary to take advantage of his right to government benefits
for which he would otherwise be ineligible. Second, reformation should be
permitted because it would allow the trustee to fulfill his duty of acting in
the best interest of his ward. 12 Acting in the best interest of the ward is
essential to the role of the trustee, and reformation would allow the trustee
to enable the disabled beneficiary to continue to receive government aid
without exhausting the trust property. Third, reformation should be
permitted because it is consistent with the doctrine of substituted
judgment.13 The presumed intent of the disabled beneficiary would be to
reform the trust so that he could be eligible for governmental benefits.14
Due to his disability, however, the beneficiary cannot request reformation.
Under the substituted judgment doctrine, the court is able to "substitute its
reasoned judgment for what the disabled individual would have decided if
able, e.g., the presumed intent of the disabled person."15 Thus, because the
beneficiary would reform the trust if he were able to, the court should
permit reformation. The court, however, should only apply the
supplemental needs trust after considering the intent of the testator's
testamentary plan and determining that there was no fraud or unjust
enrichment on the part of other beneficiaries.16 Additionally, the
requirements of EPTL §7-1.12 must also be satisfied. These include: (1)
the beneficiary of the trust suffers from a severe or chronic or persistent
disability; (2) the trust evidences the intent that the assets be used to
supplement, not supplant, government benefits; (3) the trust prohibits the
12 See In re Shah, 95 N.Y.2d 148, 158-60 (2000) (explaining that when determining whether to
approve an application for a transfer of assets, the courts should consider factors such as whether the
proposed disposition will produce an estate, gift, income, or tax savings which would benefit the
incapacitated person or his dependents). See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(d)(5) 2010
(discussing the factors that a court shall consider in order to approve a specific application for transfer
of assets).
13 Id, (citing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21).
14 Id See generally Andrew D. Wone, Don't Want to Pay for Your Institutionalized Spouse? The
Role of Spousal Refusal and Medicaid in Funding Long Term Care, 14 ELDER L.J. 485 (discussing
spousal refusal in New York).
15 In Re Will of Kamp, 7 Misc.3d 615, 621 (2005). See Shah, 95 N.Y.2d 148, 158-60 (2000)
(defining the doctrine of substituted judgment and stating that a court may grant the application if
satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, a competent, reasonable individual
in the position of the incapacitated person would be likely to perform the act or acts under the same
circumstances." See, e.g. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (emphasizing the different factors needed in
order to approve a transfer of assets).
16 In re the Estate of Longhine, 836 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. Sur. Ct., 2007). "Reformation may still be
allowed upon consideration of the relevant factors, including: 1. The intention of the testator 2. Lack of
fraud or unjust enrichment 3. Non-interference with or disruption of the dispositional plan under the
instrument." Id. See In re the Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. Sur. Ct., 2002). "Of course, the
paramount objective in interpreting a will is to determine the intention of the testator. . . ." Id.
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trustee from using assets in any way that may jeopardize the beneficiary's
entitlement to government benefits or assistance; and, (4) the beneficiary
does not have the power to assign, encumber, direct, distribute, or authorize
distribution of trust assets. 17 These factors and requirements will act as
safeguards, ensuring that the testator's intent is not frustrated and that
excessive litigation does not arise. Thus, the policies of the no-reformation
rule will not be ignored.
Part I of this article will give background information on trusts. This
part will discuss the essential elements for a valid trust, and will then
analyze the policies behind the no-reformation rule. This part will also
discuss a key case in which the concept of supplemental needs trusts was
first applied in New York and was eventually codified by EPTL §7-1.12,
the section authorizing supplemental needs trusts. Part II of this article
discusses key cases on the subject of supplemental needs trusts, the way
courts have analyzed these situations, the courts trend in allowing the
reformation of traditional trusts into supplemental needs trusts, and a case
where the court denied reformation. Part III argues that the supplemental
needs trust exception should be recognized by all New York courts,
because of the important policy of caring for the disabled, the trustee's duty
to act in the best interest of their ward, and the doctrine of substituted
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND: TRUSTS, THE NO-REFORMATION RULE, AND
SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS
This part discusses trusts generally, focusing on the no-reformation rule,
and supplemental needs trusts. Part L.A discusses the requirements for a
valid trust. Two requirements, a beneficiary and property, will then be
discussed in greater detail in order to give a better understanding of the
different effect of a traditional trust from a supplemental needs trust. Part
I.B explores the policies behind the no reformation rule. Part I.C discusses
In re Matter of Escher,18 the case in which the concept of supplemental
needs trusts originated, which was later codified in EPTL §7-1.12. This
section will then discuss the requirements of EPTL §7-1.12.
17 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.12 (2010). See In re the Estate of Newman, 856
N.Y.S.2d 500, 500 (N.Y. Sur. Ct., 2008) (quoting Kamp, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 858).
18 In re Estate of Escher, 4047 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. Sur. Ct., 1978).
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A. Trusts
The Restatement Third of Trusts defines a trust as "a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of
intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds
title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of ... one or
more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee."1 9 As this
definition suggests, the trust gives the trustee legal title and the
beneficiaries equitable title to the property. Thus, the beneficiary has the
benefit of ownership without the burden.
In New York, a trust may be created for any lawful reason, 20 so long as
there is "(1) a designated beneficiary, (2) a designated trustee, (3) a fund or
other property sufficiently designated or identified to enable title of the
property to pass to the trustee, and (4) actual delivery of the fund or
property, with the intention of vesting legal title in the trustee."21
Additionally, "[t]o constitute a trust there must be either an explicit
declaration of trust or facts and circumstances which show beyond
reasonable doubt that a trust was intended to be created." 22 As there must
be an explicit declaration or facts beyond a reasonable doubt to prove
intent, many trusts are set up as provisions in the testator's will. These
types of trusts are known as testamentary trusts. By creating a testamentary
trust, the testator ensures that his intent will be effectuated.
For the purpose of this article, the elements of a valid trust which need
further analyzing are the requirements of a beneficiary and of property.
The creator of the trust, also known as the settlor,23 must designate at least
one beneficiary.24 A beneficiary is a person who "hold[s] a beneficial
interest" in the property of the trust. 25 The settlor may name himself a
beneficiary, but a merger would exist if the settlor were the sole beneficiary
rendering the trust invalid.26 To prevent a merger, there must be at least one
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2009).
20 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.4 (2010). "An express trust may be created for any
lawful purpose." Id.
21 In re Doman, 890 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (2d Dep't., 2009). "A lifetime trust shall be valid as to any
assets therein to the extent the assets have been transferred to the trust." Id.; In re Estate of Fontanella,
304 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (3d Dep't. 1969). See Brown v. Spohr, 73 N.E. 14, 16-17 (1904).
22 Fontanella, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 (2009).
24 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 7-1.1 (2010).
25 Id.; See also Sasso v. Gallucci, 447 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (citing County Trust
Co. v. Young, 27 N.Y.S.2d 648, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1941)) (explaining that the phrase,
"beneficial interest," means the interest of the beneficiary of a trust); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 3(4) (2010) (stating that a beneficiary is a person for whose benefit property is held in trust).
26 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.1 (2010).
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or more other persons, other than the settlor, who holds a beneficial interest
in the trust.27
The trust must also designate property to which the beneficiaries have
title, resulting in the property being a financial resource of the beneficiary.
EPTL §7-1.14 states that a trust may dispose of "real and personal
property." 28 EPTL §7-1.15 elaborates by stating that "[e]very estate in
property may be disposed of' in a trust. 29 Thus, the settler is allowed to
dispose of any form of property within the trust. Additionally, the settlor
may designate the interest in the property that the beneficiaries are entitled
to in the trust. These interests include the income and the principal of the
property.30 If there is only one beneficiary, she is entitled to both the
income and principal. However, if there are multiple beneficiaries, the
trust instrument may designate some beneficiaries to the income and others
to the principal. 31
Following the death of the settlor, the income and principle interests in
the property are considered financial assets of the beneficiaries, and may
render the beneficiaries ineligible for government funded programs such as
Medicaid.32 The beneficiary may be ineligible for Medicaid because, "for
purposes of eligibility for Medicaid, the government considers the amount
of an individual's "'assets'," defined as "'all income and resources of the
individual . . . ."'33 However, "the Medicaid statutes . .. provide an
exemption ... whereby an individual may transfer his or her own income
and assets to fund an supplemental needs trust without having the funds
27 Id.
28 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.14 (2010).
29 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.15 (2010).
30 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (2010) (describing the interests of the
beneficiary); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 369(3) (2010) (explaining that the beneficial interest can include
the income and principal of the trust).
31 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (2010); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-
1.6 (2010) (stating that a beneficiary may be entitled to either the income or the principal, or both, under
the terms of the trust). See Richardson v. Richardson, 81 N.E.2d 54, 55 (N.Y. 1948) (referencing a trust
which assigned the income and principal of the trust to different parties); see also In re Arnold's Trust,
190 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (identifying a trust which designated the principal and
income from the trust to different parties).
32 See In re Will of Kamp, 790 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) ("Because the trust is not
considered an exempt resource, [the disabled] is ineligible for Medicaid funding . . . program."). In re
Estate of Longhine, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 937, at *1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 27, 2007) (explaining that
the allegedly disabled beneficiary sought reformation of his trust in order to avoid losing Medicare and
other benefits).
33 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(d)(1)(i) (2010) (stating that the term "assets" is defined as
"all income and resources of an individual and of the individual's spouse"); see also Jennings v.
Comm'r, N.Y.S. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 893 N.Y.S.2d 103, 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010) (quoting
42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(h)(1) (2010)).
7452011]
JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHThS & ECONOAC DEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:4
counted as available resources for Medicaid eligibility purposes." 34 The
exception to the Medicaid statute was codified in New York with the
enactment of EPTL §7-1.12.35
B. No-Reformation Rule
Traditionally, New York courts have held that there is no reformation of
testamentary instruments, due to the concern that reformation of
testamentary instruments would frustrate the intent of the testator's
testamentary plan and lead to excessive- litigation. 36 As stated in the
Restatement 3rd of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers, "[t]he
denial of a reformation remedy . .. was predicated on observance of the
Statute of Wills, which requires that wills be executed in accordance with
certain formalities." 37 These formalities, which ensure that the testator
intended this testamentary scheme, have been extended to trusts. 38
Accordingly, "[c]ourts ... generally loathe to reform testamentary
instruments and, as a rule, will not, unless reformation effectuates the
testator's intent."39
As the courts have stated, "[t]he prime consideration ... in all
construction proceedings is the intention of the testator .... All rules of
interpretation are subordinated to the requirement that the actual purpose of
the testator be sought and effectuated as far as is consonant with principles
of law and public policy." 40 When determining the testator's intent courts
34 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(c) (2010). See also, Jennings, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
35 Jennings, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
36 See In re Rappaport, 866 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (2008) (stating that courts generally loathe to
reform testamentary instruments); In re Estate of Longhine, 836 N.Y.S.2d 500 (2007) (explaining that
of all the courts that considered the issue, only three have allowed the reformation of a testamentary
trust). See also Matter of Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 197-98 (1981) (Jones, J., dissenting) ("To protect
testators generally from fraudulent alterations of their wills.").
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE INSTRUMENTS § 12.1 cmt. c
(2009).
38 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.17 (2010).
Every lifetime trust shall be in writing and shall be executed and acknowledged by the initial
creator and, unless such creator is the sole trustee, by at least one trustee thereof, in the manner
required by the laws of this state for the recording of a conveyance of real property or, in lieu
thereof, executed in the presence of two witnesses who shall affix their signatures to the trust
instrument. Id.
Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the
Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 578 (2007). Requirements for
proper will execution improve reliability.
39 In re Rappaport, 21 Misc.3d 919, 923 (2008). See In re of Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 196-97 (1981).
"Nor can we share the fears of the dissent that our holding will be the first step in the exercise of
judicial imagination relating to the reformation of wills." Id.
40 In re Fabbri's Will, 2 N.Y.2d 236, 239-40 (1957). See Matter of Rappaport, 866 N.Y.S.2d 483,
486 (2008) (noting the paramount importance of the testator's intent). Snide, 52 N.Y.2d at 196("Of
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have held that the "intent ... must be gleaned not from a single word or
phrase but from a sympathetic reading of the will as an entirety and in view
of all the facts and circumstances under which the provisions of the
[testamentary instrument] were framed." 41 Therefore, New York courts
have stated that "reformation [is] only allowed to correct mistakes in the
written instrument," 42 but "not ... to change the terms of a trust to
effectuate what the settlor would have done had the settlor foreseen a
change in circumstances that has occurred." 43 This, ensures that the
testator's intent is effectuated, and not varied due to changed
circumstances. Additionally, not permitting reformation ensures that no
person is unjustly enriched. The possibility of an "unintended taker" would
unjustly enrich that person and disturb the testator's dispositive scheme. 44
Furthermore, the unjust enrichment of this unintended taker would be "at
the expense of an intended beneficiary." 45 Accordingly, courts were
hesitant to reform testamentary instruments and adhered to the no-
reformation rule.
Finally, the no-reformation rule is in place to prevent excessive and
frivolous litigation. 46 If reformation of testamentary instruments were
allowed, there would be many more challenges to testamentary
instruments. These challenges would be brought by both beneficiaries who
feel they are entitled to more than they received, and from individuals who
were left nothing. If these challenges are successful, it would disturb the
testator's testamentary intent, and at the same time tie down the Surrogate
Courts with excessive litigation.47 For these reasons the New York Courts
generally adhered to the no-reformation rule and did not reform
testamentary instruments.
course it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator was possessed of testamentary intent."). Id.
41 Fabbri, 2 N.Y.2d at 240.
42 In re Rubin, 4 Misc.3d 634, 637-38 (2004).
43 Id.
44 Rubin, 4 Misc.3d at 638. "Equity rests the rationale for reformation on two related grounds:
giving effect to the donor's intention and preventing unjust enrichment.". RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE INSTRUMENTS § 12.1 cmt. b (2009) "The claim of an
unintended taker is an unjust claim".
45 Rubin, 4 Misc.3d at 638.
46 See In re of Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 197-98 (1981) (Jones, J., dissenting) ("To protect testators
generally from fraudulent alterations of their wills."); In re Estate of Snyder, 154 Misc. 156 (1935)
("Often while it may happen that a will truly expressing the intention of the testator is denied probate
for failure of proper execution, it is better this should happen under a proper construction of the
statute.").
47 Snide, 52 N.Y.2d at 197-98 (Jones, J., dissenting) (discussing the overarching policy of
protecting testators from fraudulent alterations of their wills."); 38 ROMUALDO P. ECLEVEA AND
WILLIAM H. DANNE, JR., NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE DECEDENTS' ESTATES §403 (2d ed. 2010) ("The
Legislature intended to prevent fraud and uncertainty in the testamentary disposition of property.").
2011] 747
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C. Supplemental Needs Trusts
The concept of supplemental needs trusts originated in the Medicaid
statute. The primary purpose of the Medicaid program is to enable each
state, jointly with the Federal government, to furnish "medical assistance
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary medical services." 48 For purposes of eligibility for
Medicaid, the government considers the amount of an individual's "assets,"
defined as "all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual's spouse, including any income or resources which the
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive
because of action ... by the individual or such individual's spouse. 49 If the
individual's financial assets fall below a certain income level, he or she
becomes eligible for Medicaid benefits.
"The Medicaid statutes, however, provide an exemption to this income
rule, whereby an individual may transfer his or her own income and assets
to fund an S[upplemental] N[eeds] T[rust] without having the funds
counted as available resources for Medicaid eligibility purposes."50
Congress permitted these supplemental needs trusts to be created with the
individual's income and/or assets, either as a self-settled supplemental
needs trust to benefit the individual himself or herself, or as a third-party
supplemental needs trust benefitting a disabled child or some other third
party. 51 A supplemental needs trust is similar to a traditional trust in that
there is a transfer of property into the trust, managed by a trustee, for the
benefit of the beneficiary. However, a supplemental needs trust differs
from a traditional trust, because in a supplemental needs trust the
beneficiary must be disabled, and the disabled beneficiary has no control
over any disbursements made from the trust, or the ability to revoke the
trust. 52
48 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396-1 (2010).
49 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(h)(1) (2010); see Jennings v. Comm'r, N.Y.S. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 893
N.Y.S.2d 103, 108 (2010)("For purposes of eligibility for Medicaid, the government considers the
amount of an individual's "assets," defined as "all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual's spouse, including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse
is entitled to but does not receive because of action . .. by the individual or such individual's spouse.");
see also N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 366(5)(d)(1) (2010).
50 See Jennings, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 105; 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(c) (2010).
51 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(c)(B)(iii), (iv) (2010). See also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
366(5)(d)(3)(ii)(C), (D) (2010) (pointing out needs in individuals who have children who are blind or
disabled, and those who establish trusts solely for the benefit of such a child).
52 Jennings, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 108 (stating that in a supplemental needs trust the beneficiary must
have no control over any disbursements made from the trust and no ability to revoke the trust); see Sai
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In New York, the supplemental needs trust exception was first applied
by the courts in 1978 in In re Estate of Escher.53 In Escher, Surrogate
Gelfand stated that a supplemental needs trust "establish[ed] a vehicle for
parents and guardians of ... children with severe and chronic disabilities to
provide for their children's future by transferring their funds to a trust,
created to pay for items that will enhance their children's quality of life
without jeopardizing their children's eligibility for government benefits,
such as ... Medicaid." 54 In Escher, the Surrogate Court, later affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, held that a testamentary trust established by the
parents of a disabled daughter, which provided that the principal was to be
used only "for the payment of expenses necessary for the maintenance and
support of. . . daughter," 55 was protected from the State's claim for
reimbursement of the amount that it had paid on behalf of the daughter. 56
The court further held that "a trustee could properly exercise discretionary
powers by declining to make funds available if doing so would interfere
with the beneficiary's eligibility for government benefits." 57 The Surrogate
Court in its decision explained that public assistance has become the right
of the physically and mentally disabled, particularly in light of the
extremely high cost of such care in the modem day. 58
The New York Legislature codified the holding of Escher and the
concept of supplemental needs trust in 1993, in EPTL §7-1.12, defining it
as a "discretionary trust established for the benefit of a person with a severe
and chronic or persistent disability by his or her parent, grandparent, legal
guardian, or a court." 59 A supplemental needs trust "shelter[s] a disabled
person's assets for the dual purpose of securing and maintaining eligibility
Kwan Wong v. Daines, 582 F. Supp. 2d 475, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that beneficiaries are not
given control over trust distributions because such an act would be considered a resources thereby
eliminating the eligibility for government benefits); See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1382b(e)(3)(A) (2010).
53 See generally In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc.2d 952 (1978) (permitting a parent to create a trust
for a disabled adult child, without jeopardizing the child's eligibility for government benefits).
54 Jennings, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 104-05; Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 957. "The provisions made for the life
beneficiary indicate a conclusion that she would never be self-supporting or fully capable of handling
her own affairs. This conclusion leads to an apparent primary purpose on the part of the testator to
provide for her basic needs on an ongoing basis." Id.
55 Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 955.
56 Id. At 955-56; See also In re Will of Kamp, 7 Misc.3d 615, 617 (2005) (quoting SOC. SERV.
LAW §104(3)) (providing that "no action may be brought against either the trust or the trustee to
recover the cost of assistance or care provided to such person.").
57 Hulett, supra note 4 at 324-25; See Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 961.
58 Kamp, 7 Misc.3d at 617; See Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 959 (stating that, because of the high costs
involved, programs to pay for the care of the physically and mentally disabled are now seen as
benefits).
59 In re Jennings v. Comm'r, N.Y.S. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 893 N.Y.S.2d 103, 109 (2010); See Est.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 7-1.12 (2010) (codifying the definition of a supplemental needs trust).
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for state-funded services, and enhancing the disabled person's quality of
life with supplemental care paid by his or her trust assets." 60 The
supplemental care paid for by the assets of the trust are used "to provide
additional health care services and equipment, specialized or unique
therapy, private health insurance, educational and vocational training,
computers and software, case management services, and recreational
activities for the disabled child . ."61 If the trust is a third party
supplemental needs trust, a trust which is "created and funded by someone
other than the disabled beneficiary," the assets of the trust are protected
from the State's claim for reimbursement. 62 Protection from state
reimbursement is consistent with the policy of the State of New York,
which is to encourage the creation of supplemental needs trusts for people
who are mentally or physically disabled.63
According to EPTL §7-1.12 a testamentary supplemental needs trust is
created when the following requirements are satisfied:
the person for whose benefit the trust is established suffers from a
severe or chronic or persistent disability; (2) the trust evidences the
intent that the assets be used to supplement, not supplant, government
benefits; (3) the trust prohibits the trustee from using assets in any
way that may jeopardize the beneficiary's entitlement to government
benefits or assistance; and (4) the beneficiary does not have the power
to assign, encumber, direct, distribute or authorize distribution of trust
assets.64
If the requirements of §7-1.12 are met "[i]t shall be presumed that the
creator of the trust intended that neither principal nor income be used to
pay for any expense which would otherwise be paid by government
benefits or assistance." 65 As a result the trust "prohibits the trustee from
expending or distributing trust assets in any way which may supplant,
impair or diminish government benefits or assistance for which the
beneficiary may otherwise be eligible or which the beneficiary may be
60 Jennings, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 109 (quoting In re Abraham XX, 871 N.Y.S.2d 599 (2008)).
61 Id
62 Anthony J. Enea, The ABC's of SNTS (Special Needs Trusts), 35 WESTCHESTER B .J., 25, 26-27
(2008) (noting that a third party supplemental needs trust is generally created by a parent, grandparent,
or sibling).
63 Kamp, 7 Misc.3d at 616 (discussing the legislative's intent to provide a legislative framework,
regarding the trusts, that meet the basic needs of disabled persons through government benefits or
assistance programs).
64 EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 7-1.12[a][5][i]-[iv] (2010); In re Estate of Hyman, 14 Misc.3d
1232(A) (2007); See generally In re of the Estate of Longhine, 836 N.Y.S.2d 500 (2007)(holding that a
testamentary trust should not be reformed into a supplemental needs trust).
65 EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 7-1.12(b)(1) (2010).
SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUS7 7
receiving." 66  Additionally, "the Medicaid statutes... provide an
exemption ... whereby an individual may transfer his or her own income
and assets to fund an S[upplemental] N[eeds] T[rust] without having the
funds counted as available resources for Medicaid eligibility purposes." 67
This exemption is consistent with EPTL §7-1.12.
II. REFORMATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS: THE CONFLICT
This part discusses key cases on the subject of reformation of trusts into
supplemental needs trusts. Part II.A will focus on cases in which New
York courts have allowed the reformation of traditional trusts into
supplemental needs trusts. This part will discuss two lines of cases, in
which the courts have treated the same. The first line of cases are trusts
that were created before the enactment of EPTL §7-1.12. The second line
of cases are trusts that were created after the enactment of EPTL §7-1.12.
Regardless of whether the trust was created before or after the enactment of
EPTL §7-1.12, courts have treated these cases the same. Part II.B will
discuss one recent case in which the court denied reformation of a trust into
a supplemental needs trust. This case follows the traditional rule in New
York of no reformation of testamentary instruments.
A. Two Lines of Cases in which the New York Court's Allowed Reformation
The first line of cases in which the court has allowed reformation are in
situations in which the trust was created prior to the enactment of EPTL §7-
1.12. There are four cases that fit within this scenario. In the first case,
Estate of Ciraolo,68 a will was executed by the decedent prior to the
enactment of EPTL §7-1.12.69 The will contained a provision that created a
testamentary trust leaving one-third of the decedent's residuary estate to a
disabled infant.70 The infant's mother wanted the court to reform the
provision and create a supplemental needs trust.7 1 The Surrogate Court
reformed the provision, holding that courts should reform to obtain
supplemental needs trusts when "such would be the intent of the
testator .... [And] the proposed reformation would not alter the dispositive
66 EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 7-1.12(a)(5)(ii) (2010).
67 Jennings v. Comm'r, N.Y.S. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 893 N.Y.S.2d 103, 108 (2010). See 42
U.S.C.S. § 1396p(c) (2010).
68 Ciraolo, supra note 2, at 31.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id_
5 12011]
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scheme of the will or trust at issue." 72 Additionally, the Surrogate Court
quoted Matter of Escher, by saying "it is divorced from the realities of life
to presume that if the testator were aware of the facts as they now exist, he
would desire to pay the immense cost for his child's care in preference to
having society share is burden." 73
The second case where the court allowed reformation is In re Will of
Kamp.74 In Kamp, a testamentary trust created in 1977 had been paying
annual income to the testator's mentally retarded son, the trust beneficiary,
since the testator's death in 1982, thereby rendering the beneficiary
ineligible for Medicaid benefits. 75 As a result, the trustee petitioned the
court to reform the trust into a supplemental needs trust.76 The court
granted reformation holding that the reformation was consistent with the
intent of the testator and would be in the best interest of the beneficiary.77
The court stated,
Clearly, [the beneficiary] will be better off if he has the benefit of
governmental assistance for the costs of his care and treatment
through Medicaid. Equally clearly it is in his best interests if the
trust income and assets can be retained to supplement government
benefits and provide [the beneficiary] with clothing, uncovered
medical care and recreation not otherwise provided by government
programs for retarded citizens.78
The third case where reformation was granted for a trust that was
established before the enactment of EPTL §7-1.12 was In the Matter of the
Estate of Hyman.79 In Hyman, a will provision which took effect in 1984
established a testamentary trust for the decedent's disabled son.80 The
trustee, fearing that the trust funds would be insufficient to cover the cost
of the son's medical bills not covered by insurance, sought reformation of
the trust into a supplemental needs trust.81 The court reformed the trust,
holding that the "testator's intent [was] to supplement, rather than
supplant, government benefits [as] is evident from the language of the
testamentary instrument ... and such reformation would not change the
72 Id
73 Id
74 In re Will of Kamp, 7 Misc. 3d 615 (2005).
75 Id at 616.
76 Id
77 Id. at 619.
78 Id.
79 In re Estate of Hyman, 14 Misc.3d 1232(A) (2007).
80 Id. at *1.
81 Id
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testator's dispositive plan." 82 The court stated that the "will evidences
decedent's intention to provide for [the son] to the extent that his needs are
not met by government assistance and that the trust's assets be used to
supplement, not supplant, government benefits."8 3
The fourth and final case where reformation of a trust, created prior to
the enactment of EPTL §7-1.12, was permitted, is In the Matter of the
Estate of Newman.84 In Newman, the decedent died in 1988 leaving a will
that created a testamentary trust for the decedent's disabled daughter.85 At
the time of the execution of the will "the decedent was aware that his
daughter had developmental, cognitive and physical disabilities which
prevented her from being educated past the third grade." 86 At the time,
however EPTL §7-1.12 was not yet enacted. 87 The trustee petitioned the
court to reform the trust into a supplemental needs trust. 88 The court
reformed the trust, holding that all of the requirements for a valid
supplemental needs trust established by EPTL §7-1.12 were fulfilled.89
Furthermore, the court held that "this case falls within the line of cases
where courts reformed a testamentary trust into a supplemental needs trust,
based upon the presumption that the testator would have utilized that
device had the testator known that it would be possible to prevent
exhaustion of the trust on expenses covered by governmental benefits."90
Accordingly, the court held that reforming the trust was valid as the
supplemental needs trust did effectuate the testator's intent and was in the
best interest of the disabled beneficiary. 91
The second line of cases in which the court granted reformation are cases
where the trusts were created after the enactment of EPTL §7-1.12. There
are three cases that fit within this scenario. The first case is In the Matter
of the Estate of Hulett.92 In Hulett, the decedent's 1995 will created a
testamentary trust for her daughter who suffered from serious mental
82 Id. at *3.
83 Id. at *4.
84 In re Estate of Newman, 18 Misc.3d 1118(A) (2008)
85 Id.at *1.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. (holding that the testamentary trust created can be reformed into a supplemental needs trust
because reformation comports with E.P.T.L. §7-1.12).
90 Id
91 Id. (holding that reformation does not disrupt the dispositional plan under the will and absent a
supplemental needs trust the daughter is in danger of losing governmental benefits).
92 Hulett, supra note 4.
2011] 753
JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMTCDEVELOPAENT [Vol.25:4
disability.93 Although the trust provision indicated that the trustee should
consider other resources of the daughter in deciding how much of the trust
income to apply for the benefit of the daughter, it did not comply with the
requirements for the creation of a supplemental needs trust under EPTL §7-
1.12.94 The executor of the will sought to reform the trust so that it would
comply with the statutory requirements, thereby shielding the corpus of the
trust from claims of reimbursement, and permitting the daughter to
continue receiving public assistance. 95 The court concluded that the
testator's knowledge of her daughter's condition and the fact that she was
receiving public assistance, coupled with the admonition in the instrument
to consider other assets of the daughter, demonstrated a clear intent on the
part of the decedent not to have payments from the trust supplant public
benefits, but rather, to have the payments supplement those benefits. 96 The
court noted that the courts have long honored such intentions and have
construed the trust language as creating a supplemental needs trust. 97
The second case where reformation was granted was in In the Matter of
the Estate of Longhine.98 In Longhine, the decedent's 2005 will created a
testamentary trust for a disabled adult child, but the trust did not comply
with the requirements of EPTL §7-1.12 to qualify as a supplemental needs
trust.99 The guardian for the disabled child petitioned the court to reform
the instrument so that it would qualify, and the child would not lose his
eligibility for Supplemental Security Income and Medicare, which he was
receiving.100 The court held that although there was no clearly expressed
intention to qualify the trust as a supplemental needs trust, the court could
presume that the decedent would not have wanted his son to lose the
government benefits he was currently receiving and would likely receive in
the future.101
The third and final case where reformation of a trust created after the
93 Id. at 323.
94 Id. at 323-24.
95 Id
96 Id. at 325. "It is clear that decedent intended that the trust assets be used to supplement, not
supplant, impair or diminish any benefits or assistance for which the beneficiary might otherwise be
eligible." Id.
97 Id. at 323-24 (citing to In re Escher 94 Misc.2d 952 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1978)) (holding that the
settlor's clear intent to supplement rather than supplant public benefits for a third party should be
honored).
98 In re Estate of Longhine, 15 Misc.3d 1106(A) (2007).
99 Id
100 Id
101 Id
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enactment of EPTL §7-1.12 was granted, was in Matter ofRappaport.102 In
Rappaport, the decedent's 2006 will created a testamentary trust naming
the decedent's disabled daughter as income beneficiary.103 The disabled
child's guardian petitioned the court to reform the trust into a supplemental
needs trust. 104 The court reformed the trust holding that the reformation
met the criteria set out by EPTL§7-1.12, the decedent's intent was for the
"trust's assets be used to supplement, not supplant, government
benefits," 105 the proposed reformation "[did] not alter decedent's
testamentary plan,"l 06 and the requested reformation was in the best
interests of the disabled daughter.10 7
Though these two lines of cases have factual differences, "the courts
have not focused upon whether the decedent's will was executed before or
after ... the enactment of EPTL 7-1.12."108 Similarly, the courts have
permitted testamentary trusts to be reformed to "create . . . supplemental
needs trust notwithstanding the fact that the trusts have been operative for
many years prior to the reformation application." 09 As the cases above
show, the courts focus on the intent of the testamentary plan of the testator,
the requirements of EPTL §7-1.12, and the best interest of the disabled
beneficiary.
B. Reformation Prohibited
A recent case in which the court prohibited the reformation of a
testamentary trust into a supplemental needs trust was In re Rubin. 110 Rubin
is a consolidation of "two independent applications, decided together,
concerning inter vivos trusts for beneficiaries with long-term
disabilities."11' The first case in Rubin concerned a lifetime trust created in
1972 for the benefit of a disabled grandchild. 112 The trust "was created
102 In re Rappaport, 21 Misc.3d 919 (2008).
103 Id. at 920-21.
104 Id
105 Id. at 924-25.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id
109 Id. In re Estate of Newman, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 149, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 22,
2008) (acknowledging the trust was created in 1973 and reformed in 2008); see In re Estate of Hyman,
2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 402, at *1, *4 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 16, 2007) (noting that the respective
testamentary trust was in existence for more than 20 years prior to its reformation); see also In re Estate
of Kamp, 790 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856, 858 (2005) (stating that the trust took effect in 1982 and was
reformed in 2005).
110 In re Rubin, 781 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2004).
111 Id at 422.
112 Id. (referring to the trust created by Sylvia Rubin).
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before supplemental needs trusts were authorized by either case law or
statute."113 The income from the trust disqualified the disabled grandchild
from receiving certain needs-based benefits from the federal government as
well as from the State of California where she resided. 114 Furthermore, the
trust income was no longer sufficient to provide her with appropriate
medical care and supervision, the cost of which had increased substantially
in the preceding years.115 A petition was brought to reform the trust to
qualify as a supplemental needs trust. 116
The second case in Rubin involved three trusts,11 7 all created before
supplemental needs trusts were authorized by either case law or by statute,
for the benefit of the decedent's five grandchildren.' 18 One grandchild was
developmentally disabled, who at the time was receiving government
benefits that paid for all of the his needs, including the cost of the assisted
living facility where he resided.119 As a beneficiary of the trusts, this
disabled grandchild would no longer qualify for the Medicaid benefits on
which he was depending. 120 The trustee requested, first, that the trusts be
divided to sever the disabled grandchild's interest from those of his siblings
and, second, to reform the disabled grandchild's trusts to provide that his
shares be held in continuing supplemental needs trusts instead of
distributed to him outright. 121
In both proceedings, petitioners contended that the settlors' intent to
provide for their disabled grandchildren could not be carried out under the
terms of the trusts they created. 122 Additionally, petitioners noted that when
the various trusts were created it was not clear that supplemental needs
113 Id
114 Id.
115 Id
116 Id.
117 Id. (referring to the trusts created by Katherine Morimer. One for the disabled beneficiary
Alston Shields).
118 Id. at 636 (stating that the three trusts were created in 1945, 1959, and 1964 respectively).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id
122 Id. at 637.
In the case of Ms. Rubin, her trustees show that the full extent of the disability and the cost of
her future care were not known or anticipated in 1972 when the trust was established. In the case
of Mr. Shields, the first trust was created before he was born. The other trusts were created when
he was 8 and 13 years old, respectively. It was apparent shortly after his birth that he was not an
entirely healthy child, and he was placed in a residential treatment center at the age of 2 1/2
years. His care was largely paid for by Mrs. Mortimer, who petitioners believe made no special
arrangement for him in the various trusts she created for the family because she hoped her
grandson would grow out of his problems. Id.
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trusts were lawful.123 Due to these circumstances, petitioners argued that
the court should permit reformation of the interests of the disabled
beneficiaries "to place the inherited assets they would otherwise receive
outright into supplemental needs trusts deemed settled by their respective
grandmothers."l 24
In both cases, the court denied reformation. Following the traditional no
reformation rule the court held that "reformation may not be used to change
the terms of a trust to effectuate what the settlor would have done had the
settlor foreseen a change of circumstances that has occurred." 25 The court
cited to the Restatement Third of Property which states that "reformation is
unavailable to modify a document in order to compensate for changes in
circumstances."1 26 The court continued by noting that a donor may
establish a trust for another to avoid the claims for reimbursement by state
and federal agencies,127 and just as certainly an ambiguous trust may be
construed to effectuate an intent to avoid such claims.128 However, the
court held that nothing requires or suggests that courts ought to "alter an
unambiguous instrument to achieve outcomes never expressed by the
creator of the instrument. Imputing intent in this way would substitute the
judiciary's value system for that of the donor, which sometimes may
accord with the creator's wishes, but just as frequently may defy them."129
Finally, the court held that reformation is prohibited because the trust as
written is able to effectuate the testator's presumed intent, and reformation
would alter the testator's dispositive scheme.130 The court stated that
"petitioners have not shown that the settlors' presumed intent is incapable
of fulfillment under the trusts as drafted." 31 As the trusts were drafted, the
disabled beneficiaries would be able to continue receiving government aid
subject to state and federal claims for reimbursement. 132 As the disabled
123 Id. "In both proceedings, petitioners observe that when the various trusts were created it was
not clear that supplemental needs trusts were lawful. It was not until 1978, when Surrogate Gelfand
issued his decision in Matter of Escher . . . that the validity of such trusts was expressly recognized....
Furthermore, it was not until 1993 that EPTL 7-1.12 was enacted, providing statutory authority for the
creation of supplemental needs trusts." Id.
124 Id
125 Id. at 638.
126 Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE INSTRUMENTS § 12.1
cmt. h (2003).
127 Rubin, 4 Misc.3d at 638 ("Certainly a donor may establish a trust for another to avoid the
claims of these agencies[.]"); See EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 7-1.12 (2010).
128 Rubin, 4 Misc.3d at 638 ("[Ajnd just as certainly an ambiguous trust may be construed to
effectuate an intent to avoid such claims[.]").
129 Id.
130 Id. at 639.
131 Id.
132 Id. "The inheritance of each beneficiary may be placed in a 'self-settled' supplemental needs
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beneficiaries can still receive government aid, and there is no language in
the trusts preventing reimbursement, there is no reason to reform the trust.
Additionally, the court noted that reformation would interfere with the
testator's dispositive scheme. Interference with the testator's dispositive
scheme would occur because reformation "would increase the shares of the
siblings of the disabled beneficiaries at the expense of creditors,
particularly the state and federal governments that supply the medical
benefits petitioners want to preserve."l 33
III. REFORMATION OF TRUSTS INTO SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS
SHOULD BE A RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION TO THE TRADITIONAL No
REFORMATION RULE
This part will argue that although the New York courts should continue
to enforce the traditional no-reformation of testamentary instruments rule,
they should also recognize the supplemental needs trust exception. The
New York courts should recognize this exception for three reasons. First,
reformation should be permitted because caring for the disabled is an
important public policy. 134 Government assistance has changed in three
important respects over the years. It has evolved from a gift into a right, it
is no longer associated with a stigma, and it is viewed as an insurance
benefit rather than a charity.135 Second, reformation should be permitted
because it would allow the trustee to fulfill his duty of acting in the best
interest of his ward.136 Third, reformation should be permitted because it is
trust, made possible by the enactment in 1993 of the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ....
This act permits the transfer of assets of a disabled person under the age of 65 to a trust that
supplements but does not supplant Medicaid benefits . .. New York thereafter amended EPTL 7-1.12 . .
to conform to the federal law."
133 Id
134 See In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc.2d 952, 959 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1978). "Charity bestowed by the
State or any local political subdivision thereof to alleviate the suffering of the destitute is a grant or gift
by an enlightened government that seeks to keep its less fortunate citizens from deprivation and want.
It is in fact a gift by all the other citizens of the State and community who work, earn and pay taxes to
the less fortunate who are unable to work and support themselves." (quoting In re Estate of Van Gaalen,
38 Misc.2d 853, 855 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1963)).
135 Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 959-60 (demonstrating the shift in society's perception of government
assistance). See e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). "[Welfare] benefits are a matter of
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."
136 See In re Shah, 95 N.Y.2d 148, 159 (N.Y. 2000) "A court may authorize a guardian: 'to
exercise those powers necessary and sufficient to manage the property and financial affairs of the
incapacitated person; to provide for the maintenance and support of the incapacitated person, and those
persons depending upon the incapacitated person; to transfer a part of the incapacitated person's assets
to or for the benefit of another person on the ground that the incapacitated person would have made the
transfer if he or she had the capacity to act."' (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a) (2010));
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.12 (2010). "EPTL 10-6.6(b)(1) authorizes a trustee who has
the absolute discretion to invade trust principal for the benefit of a beneficiary to exercise that power by
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consistent with the doctrine of substituted judgment.137  The court,
however, should only apply the supplemental needs trust after considering
the intent of the testator's testamentary plan and determining that there was
no fraud or unjust enrichment on the part of other beneficiaries. 138
Additionally, the requirements of EPTL §7-1.12 must also be satisfied. 139
These requirements act as safeguards, ensuring that the testator's intent is
not frustrated and that excessive litigation does not arise. 140
The Legislature's intent in enacting EPTL §7-1.12 conforms with the
policy of the State of New York to authorize and encourage supplemental
needs trusts for disabled persons. The Legislature declared its intent in the
following words:
This act is intended to provide a legislative framework for the use
of trusts to meet the supplemental needs of persons with
disabilities whose basic needs are expected to be met, in large
part, through government benefits or assistance programs. The
purpose of the legislation is to encourage future care planning by
instilling greater confidence in families and friends of persons
with disabilities that the trusts they establish for recipients of
government assistance will be used for the purposes they intend.
This act is intended to benefit individuals with a wide variety of
disabilities including, but not limited to, mental illness and
appointing all or part of the principal of the trust to the trustee of another trust, created under a separate
instrument, provided certain requirements are met. This section permits the trustee of a trust for the
benefit of a disabled person which does not qualify as a supplemental needs trust to appoint the
principal of the trust to the trustee of a supplemental needs trust, even if the supplemental needs trust is
established only to accept the appointment from the existing trust."
137 MENTAL HYG. LAW, § 81.01 (2010) (explaining that the guardianship system takes into account
the personal preferences, wishes and desires of the incapacitated individual); Shah, 95 N.Y.2d at 159
(noting the only limitation on a guardian is the doctrine of substituted judgment).
138 In re Estate of Longhine, 15 Misc. 3d 1106A, 1106A (2007) "Reformation may still be allowed
upon consideration of the relevant factors, including: 1. The intention of the testator 2. Lack of fraud or
unjust enrichment 3. Non-interference with or disruption of the dispositional plan under the
instrument."
139 See EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, § 7-1.12(a)(5) (2010). See also In re Estate of Newman, 18
Misc. 3d I 18A, II 18A (2008):
Pursuant to EPTL 7-1.12(a)(5), enacted in 1993, a testamentary [supplemental needs trust]
may be created where: (1) the beneficiary of the trust suffers from a severe or chronic or
persistent disability; (2) the trust evidences the intent that the assets be used to supplement,
not supplant, government benefits; (3) the trust prohibits the trustee from using assets in any
way that may jeopardize the beneficiary's entitlement to government benefits or assistance;
and, (4) the beneficiary does not have the power to assign, encumber, direct, distribute, or
authorize distribution of trust assets.
140 In re Estate of Hyman, 14 Misc. 3d 1232A, 1232A (2007) (explaining that courts have shown a
willingness to reform when such reformation would not change the testator's dispositive plan).
Newman, 18 Misc. 3d at 1118A (noting that reformation would not disrupt the dispositional plan under
the will and, instead the creation of the supplemental needs trust is necessary to preserve the plan).
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developmental disabilities. 141
The Legislature's goal was to create a mechanism to allow for the future
care of the disabled. There are three reasons why allowing reformation is
consistent with this goal.
The first reason why reformation should be permitted is because caring
for the disabled is an important public policy. 142 Government assistance
has changed in three important respects over the years. It has evolved from
a gift into a right, it is no longer associated with a stigma, and it is viewed
as an insurance benefit rather than a charity. 143 Surrogate Gelfand, in his
decision in Matter of Escher,144 explained that public assistance has
become the right of the physically and mentally disabled, particularly in
light of the extremely high cost of such care in the modern day.145 The
Surrogate stated that preceding cases presumed that a person would prefer
paying for the needs of a disabled relative in lieu of welfare contributing
thereto.146  However, this philosophy has changed and now public
assistance has "evolved from being a gift into a right which must be
provided by State and local governments to all who show need, without
even regard to the capacity of their respective taxpayers to generate the
required revenue to pay the mounting cost of this right."' 47 Additionally,
public assistance programs have expanded to meet the peculiar needs of the
ill, the aged, the disabled, and the handicapped.148 Accordingly,
reformation should be permitted as everyone is entitled to government
funded programs, and not permitting reformation, when the testator's
dispositive scheme is not disturbed and the requirements of EPTL §7-1.12
are satisfied, takes away this right.
The second change in the view of government assistance is that there is
141 In re Kamp, 7 Misc. 3d 615, 616 (2005).
142 See In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc. 2d 952, 959 (1978) "Charity bestowed by the State or any
local political subdivision thereof to alleviate the suffering of the destitute is a grant or gift by an
enlightened government that seeks to keep its less fortunate citizens from deprivation and want. It is in
fact a gift by all the other citizens of the State and community who work, earn and pay taxes to the less
fortunate who are unable to work and support themselves." (quoting In re Van Gaalen's Estate, 38
Misc. 2d 853, 855 (1963)); In re Gruber's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (1953) "State and local political
subdivisions thereof will not sit by and permit a destitute person to starve and die from want of lack of
care."
143 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 "The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and
shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as
the legislature may from time to time determine."; Escher, 94 Misc. 2d at 959-60 (stating that public
assistance is a right which must be provided by the State and local governments to all who show need).
144 In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc.2d 952 (1978).
145 Id. at 959.
146 Id.
147 Id. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (U.S. 1970).
148 Id. (recognizing the expansion of public assistance programs).
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no longer a stigma attached to receiving government benefits.149 In Matter
of Escher, Surrogate Gelfand stated that, "[i]n the context of modem
society, the stigma attached to receiving the benefits of these programs has
largely disappeared, particularly with reference to those programs designed
to meet the astronomical cost of illness or institutional care of any sort."150
This change in policy is important when determining the testator's intent.
Since a stigma is no longer associated with collecting government
assistance, it would be inconsistent to believe that the testator would not
have wanted the government funded programs to provide for the disabled
beneficiary.151 Accordingly, reformation should be permitted to allow the
disabled beneficiary to maintain his government benefits.
Finally, government assistance is now viewed more as an insurance
benefit then charity.152 In view of the vast costs involved in caring for the
disabled, logic suggests that receiving government assistance is a benefit
most citizens would seek for their loved ones, rather than rapidly
expending their total assets.1 53 Furthermore, "it is divorced from the
realities of life to presume that if a testator were aware of the facts as they
now exist, he would desire to pay the immense cost" 154 of care in
preference to having society share this burden. In Escher, Surrogate
Gelfand stated that, "to apply to these facts a conclusion that the testator
would find accepting benefits to be a repugnant humiliation at becoming
the object of charity is an anachronism."1 55 As access to government
funded programs is viewed as insurance benefit available to everyone, it
would be unjust to remove this benefit from the disabled. Additionally, it
would be unfair to prevent a disabled person from receiving these
government benefits simply due to the fact supplemental needs trusts had
not yet been authorized or due to mistake. As the government benefits are
149 Id. See 89 Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, CAL.
L. REv. 569, 604 (citing the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly which established that welfare benefits
were a form of property and thus could not be terminated without the due process protections of prior
notice and a hearing. Significantly, the Goldberg Court rejected the argument that welfare benefits were
a "privilege," rather than a "right.).
150 Id.
151 See Id. See also In re Will of Kamp, 7 Misc.3d 615, 618 (2005) (quoting In re Estate of Escher,
94 Misc.2d 952, 959-60 (1978)) (declaring a stigma is no longer associated with receiving benefits from
government).
152 Id. See Kamp, 7 Misc.3d at 618 (quoting Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 959-60) (stating government
programs that pay medical and institutional care are viewed more as an insurance benefit as opposed to
charity).
153 Id. See Kamp, 7 Misc.3d at 618 (quoting Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 959-60) (rationalizing most
decedents would prefer their descendants receive government assistance for medical and institutional
care rather than paying for those benefits from the decedent's estate).
154 Id. See Kamp, 7 Misc.3d at 618 (quoting Escher, 94 Misc.2d at 959-60).
155 Id. at 959
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a right of the disabled and not a charity, and there is no longer a stigma
attached to receiving government benefits, not permitting reformation
would be inconsistent with the policy of caring for the disabled.
A second reason why reformation should be permitted is because it
would allow the trustee to fulfill his duty of acting in the best interest of his
ward.156 The New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Shah,157 held that a
guardian for a disabled individual has the right and power to engage in
Medicaid planning for the ward.158 In Shah, the Court of Appeals
authorized the wife and guardian of a man in a permanent coma to transfer
all of his assets to her to allow him to qualify for Medicaid and also so she
could provide for herself and their children.159 In reaching its holding the
Court of Appeals explained, "[t]here can be no quarreling with the
Supreme Court's determination that any person in Mr. Shah's condition
would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, as opposed to
his family." 60 The request to reform a trust into a supplemental needs trust
is for the purpose of allowing the disabled to qualify for Medicaid, which is
in effect Medicaid planning. Thus, the policy of the State, as established
by the Court of Appeals, favors planning to permit disabled individuals to
secure the financial benefits of Medicaid, while retaining supplemental
income and assets.
A third reason why reformation should be permitted is because it is
consistent with the doctrine of substituted judgment.161 Article 81 of the
Mental Hygiene Law,162 "adopts the doctrine of substituted judgment
whereby a court can substitute its reasoned judgment for what the disabled
individual would have decided if able, e.g., the presumed intent of the
disabled person." 63 In most cases the provision preventing the trust from
156 See In re Shah, 95 N.Y.2d 148, 158-60 (2000). See also MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (2010)
(stating generally that there is a fiduciary duty from a guardian for personal needs and management to a
person with incapacities).
157 In re Shah, 95 N.Y.2d 148 (2000).
158 Id
159 Id.
160 Id. at 160.
161 Id. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (2010).
162 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (2010).
163 See In re Will of Kamp, 7 Misc.3d 615, 621 (2005). See also Shah, 95 N.Y.2d at 158-60;
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (e) (2010).
(e) The court may grant the application if satisfied by clear and convincing evidence of the
following and shall make a record of these findings: 1. the incapacitated person lacks the
requisite mental capacity to perform the act or acts for which approval has been sought and
is not likely to regain such capacity within a reasonable period of time or, if the
incapacitated person has the requisite capacity, that he or she consents to the proposed
disposition; 2. a competent, reasonable individual in the position of the incapacitated
person would be likely to perform the act or acts under the same circumstances; and 3. the
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being a supplemental needs trust is the required distribution of income to
the disabled beneficiary.164 In these cases, it can be safe to presume that if
the disabled were able to, they would choose to have a supplemental needs
trust for their benefit rather than have the trust income utilized to reduce or
eliminate their Medicaid benefits.165 If able, the disabled could renounce
his right to income thereby qualifying the trust as a supplemental needs
trust. 166 The court could likewise renounce the income for him by
application of substituted judgment to achieve what would be in the
disabled's best interests.167 Accordingly, the policy of substituted judgment
encourages permitting reformation.
The opposition to the supplemental needs trust exception argues that
allowing supplemental needs trusts places the burden of caring for the
disabled on society. As government programs such as Medicaid are funded
through tax dollars, tax payers would help bear the cost of paying for the
disabled person's medical care. However this argument is without merit.
Governor Mario Cuomo in his memorandum on the bill, pointed out that
encouraging supplemental needs trusts is a benefit to everyone, including
the State, despite the potential loss of reimbursement to the Medicaid
program.168 The Governor stated that,
incapacitated person has not manifested an intention inconsistent with the performance of
the act or acts for which approval has been sought at some earlier time when he or she had
the requisite capacity or, if such intention was manifested, the particular person would be
likely to have changed such intention under the circumstances existing at the time of the
filing of the petition. Id.
164 See Kamp, 7 Misc.3d at 621 (stating that in Kamp the provision preventing the trust from being
a supplemental needs trust is the required distribution of income to Henry the disabled beneficiary). See
also MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (d) (2010) (enumerating factors courts can consider in approving
applications for petitions for appointment of trustees [guardians] for personal needs or property
management, including the distribution of income provision).
165 See In re Estate of Kamp, 790 N.Y.S.2d 852, 857 (Sur. Ct. 2005) (holding that if the
beneficiary of the trust was able to choose he "would choose to have a supplemental needs trust for his
benefit rather than have the trust income utilized to reduce or eliminate his Medicaid benefits"); Cf In
re Estate of Longhine, 836 N.Y.S.2d 500, 500 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (noting that courts have created a
presumptive intent on behalf of the donor or testator to take advantage of public benefits as the primary
means of providing for the disabled donee).
166 See Kamp 790 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (explaining that the beneficiary of the trust could renounce his
right to income thereby qualifying the trust as a supplemental needs trust); See also In re Estate of Kalt,
108 P.2d. 401, 404 (Cal. 1940) (holding that a "legatee is free to renounce even a beneficial bequest, so
long as the rights of third parties are not involved").
167 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(e) (2010) (adopting the substituted judgment doctrine
when the incapacitated person lacks the mental capacity to perform the act for which court approval has
been sought and where a competent, reasonable person would be likely to perform the act under the
same circumstances); See Kamp 790 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (holding that the court could apply substituted
judgment to achieve what would be in the disabled beneficiary's best interest).
168 Governors of New York, available at http://www.state.ny.us/govemor/nygovs/index.html
(stating that Cuomo was elected New York State's 52nd Governor in 1982. He served as governor for
12 years until 1994).
2011] 763
764 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGH15 & ECONOMTCDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:4
Arguably, everyone, including the State, can only benefit ...
[F]amilies play a multitude of roles in their relatives' lives, in
many ways analogous to an intensive case manager. By
providing a mechanism which permits families to express on-
going personal concern and provide supplemental support for a
person with disabilities, the State is bolstering the ability of
families to help their relatives access services, maintain a
better quality of life and, in some cases, remain in the
community and more in the mainstream with all the attendant
societal and financial benefits. In conjunction with educational
efforts and program development, this legislation should help
facilitate future care planning efforts for disabled individuals
throughout the State. 169
As everyone benefits from government funded programs, there is no
concern that society bears the burden of caring for the disabled.
Furthermore, in adopting supplemental needs trusts, "[t]he State is
bolstering the ability of families to help their relatives access services,
maintain a better quality of life and, in some cases, remain in the
community and more in the mainstream with all the attendant societal and
financial benefits." 70 These advantages to families and to the state, benefit
all and greatly outweigh the costs of contributing to Medicaid.
CONCLUSION
Due to the unique function of supplemental needs trusts, New York
courts should recognize an exception to the no reformation rule. This
exception to the no reformation should apply for three reasons. First,
caring for the disabled is an important public policy. Accordingly,
government assistance has changed in that it has evolved from a gift into a
right, it is no longer associated with a stigma, and it is viewed as an
insurance benefit rather than a charity. Second, reformation would allow
the trustee to fulfill his duty of acting in the best interest of his ward.
Finally, reformation is consistent with the doctrine of substituted judgment.
However, reformation should only be permitted when it does not change
the testator's testamentary intent, or unjustly enrich a party. Additionally,
the requirements of EPTL §7-1.12 must also be satisfied. These
requirements are sufficient safeguards to ensure that excessive and
frivolous litigation does not occur. If these requirements are satisfied, the
169 Kamp, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (quoting Governor Courno's memorandum on the bill enabling
supplemental needs trusts).
170 Id
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New York Court's should be able to reform a testamentary trust into a
supplemental needs trust.

